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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Garnishee PSI Pumping Solutions, Inc. (“PSI”) appeals from the order of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania entering judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff Sanact, Inc. (“Sanact”) and against PSI in the amount of $197,133.82 
for accounts payable to Defendant US Pipelining, LLC (“US Pipelining”).  PSI also 
appeals from the District Court’s order denying its motion for relief from judgment under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  We will vacate both orders and remand for 
further proceedings. 
I. 
 On December 28, 2018, Sanact registered in the District Court three judgments 
against US Pipelining and in Sanact’s favor from the United States District Court for the 
District of Hawaii.  In total, Sanact’s judgments amounted to $199,633.82.  After Sanact 
had obtained a judgment against Santander Bank via Pennsylvania’s garnishment 
process, this amount was reduced to $199,010.52.   
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




 On July 30, 2019, Sanact filed a praecipe for writ of execution, and the writ of 
execution was issued on the same day.  The writ of execution—together with the writ of 
execution notice, the claim for exemption form, and interrogatories to garnishee—were 
served on PSI.  The interrogatories asked PSI to answer, among other things, the 
following question:   
  1.  At the time you were served or at any subsequent time did you owe the 
defendant any money or were you liable to the defendant on any negotiable 
or other written instrument, or did the defendant claim that you owed the 
defendant any money or were liable to the defendant for any reason?   
 
(A40.)   
 On September 5, 2019, PSI’s answer to Sanact’s interrogatories was filed. 
Matthew Aiello, PSI’s project manager, signed this letter on August 30, 2019.  In 
response to Interrogatory #1, he stated the following: 
1.  Yes, PSI still has an outstanding balance owed the defendant a balance 
of $522,791.00.  They still owe money to various contractors/suppliers 
on our job in the amount of $323,086.00 to MTC, and other amounts at 
the request of US Pipelining to PSI to coordinate equaling $206.015.37.  
Along with Powerhouse Equipment & Engineering Company for the 
amount of $16,510.56. 
 
(A39.)1  Sanact then filed on September 6, 2019 a praecipe to enter judgment against PSI, 
claiming that, pursuant to PSI’s answer, PSI owes US Pipelining an outstanding balance 
in the amount of $522,791.00.  According to Sanact, “[t]he payments that [US Pipelining] 
owes to its various contractors and/or suppliers are the debts and obligations of [US 
Pipelining] and have no bearing on or relevance to the amount that [PSI] owes to [US 
 
1  Separately, Matthew Aiello also filed an additional answer on behalf of PSI, 
stating that “Yes, PSI still has an outstanding balance owed the defendant.”  (A50.)  “The 




Pipelining],” and “[PSI] has no contractual obligation to pay [US Pipelining’s] 
contractors and/or suppliers.”  (A58.)  “In fact, [PSI] is prohibited from paying [US 
Pipelining’s] debts or obligations on behalf of [US Pipelining].”2  (Id.; see also A59 
(“Pursuant to paragraph (2)(b) of the Writ of Execution, garnishee, [PSI] is prohibited 
from ‘paying any debt to or for the account of defendant and from delivering any 
property of defendant or otherwise disposing thereof.’”).)    
 On September 20, 2019, the District Court ordered judgment be entered in favor of 
Sanact and against PSI in the amount of $197,133.82 for accounts payable to US 
Pipelining.  Now represented by counsel, on September 30, 2019 PSI filed a motion 
requesting relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b).  It submitted with this motion 
declarations executed by the Aiellos as well as amended answers to interrogatories with 
new matter.  After conducting oral argument and receiving additional briefing, the 
District Court denied the Rule 60(b) motion on December 31, 2019. 
II. 
 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3146 governs “Judgment against Garnishee 
upon Default or Admission in Answer to Interrogatories.”3  Specifically, Rule 3146(b)(1) 
 
2 Due to a miscalculation with respect to the prejudgment and postjudgment 
interest, the District Court Clerk believed that the judgment sought exceeded the 
registered amounts and accordingly referred the praecipe to enter judgment to the District 
Court.  The District Court conducted a telephone conference regarding this possible 
discrepancy, with Matthew Aiello and Michael Aiello (vice president and CEO of PSI) 
speaking on behalf of PSI. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over this garnishment proceeding pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996) (indicating 
approval of exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over garnishment proceedings).  We have 




states the following: 
Subject to paragraph (2) of this subdivision [applicable to financial 
institutions], the prothonotary, on praecipe of the plaintiff, shall enter 
judgment against the garnishee for the property of the defendant admitted 
in the answer to interrogatories to be in the garnishee’s possession, subject 
to any right therein claimed by the garnishee, but no money judgment 
entered against the garnishee shall exceed the amount of the judgment of 
the plaintiff against the defendant together with interest and costs.  The 
entry of judgment shall not bar the right of the plaintiff to proceed against 
the garnishee as to any further property or to contest any right in the 
property claimed by the garnishee. 
 
It is clear that this manner of entering judgment—which involves the prothonotary (or 
clerk in the case of federal district courts)—is triggered in only certain limited 
circumstances.  We agree with PSI that such circumstances were not present in this 
matter.  
“Admissions of a garnishee in answers to a judgment creditor’s interrogatories 
will support the entry of a judgment thereon ‘only in a clear case, where there is a distinct 
admission of liability by the garnishee to the defendant.’”  Ruehl v. Maxwell Steel Co., 
474 A.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting Bartram Building & Loan Ass’n 
 
judgment based on PSI’s admission contained in its Answers to Interrogatories is 
reviewed de novo.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 13 (citing Wolfington v. Reconstructive 
Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2019)); see also Appellant’s 
Brief at 13-14.)  We review the District Court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(b) for an 
abuse of discretion (other than a ruling under Rule 60(b)(4), which triggers a plenary 
standard of review).  See, e.g. Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
It is undisputed that Pennsylvania law governs the execution and garnishment 
process in this matter.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1).  Ultimately, the plaintiff assumes the 
rights the defendant has against the garnishee while the garnishee is permitted to raise 
any defense or counterclaim it may possess against the defendant.  See, e.g., Pa. R. Civ. 
P. 3145(b)(2); Collins v. O’Donnell, 191 A. 22, 23 (Pa. 1937); Frazier v. Berg, 159 A. 




v. Eggleston, 6 A.2d 508, 510 (Pa. 1939)).  As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
indicated (by quoting with approval the “authoritative work on Pennsylvania practice,” 
Siders v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 423 F.2d 535, 537 n.3 (3d Cir. 1970)): 
Certainly, if there is any doubt regarding the garnishee’s admission, 
the prothonotary cannot and should not enter judgment on the 
plaintiff’s praecipe.  The prothonotary, who acts in this regard in a 
purely ministerial capacity, can enter judgment only if the answers 
are clear and unequivocal; to analyze or interpret the garnishee’s 
answers would be in effect to exercise a judicial function, which is in 
excess of his powers.  The prothonotary should be guided by the 
usual practice in assumpsit actions.  Conformity to that practice is in 
fact dictated by Rule 3145(a).  In assumpsit, judgment on admissions 
in the pleadings—perhaps the closest analogue to judgment against 
the garnishee on the basis of admissions to his answer—cannot be 
entered unless some part of the plaintiff’s claim is “unequivocally 
and unqualifiedly admitted to be due by the defendant’s answer.” 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 
Ruehl, 474 A.2d at 1164 (quoting Goodrich-Amram 2d § 3146(b):1.1).   
 PSI’s answer to Sanact’s interrogatories did not rise to the level of an unequivocal 
admission of liability.  According to Sanact, the statement “Yes, PSI still has an 
outstanding balance owed the defendant a balance of $522,791.00”—was “an 
unequivocal statement that PSI owes US Pipelining $522,791.00, an amount more than 
sufficient to satisfy Sanact’s judgments against US Pipelining.”  (Appellee’s Brief at 17.)  
It then contends that the answer “provided that US Pipelining owed certain amounts to 
MTC and other third parties [which Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3111(d) and 
the terms of the writ of execution prohibited PSI from paying], but the language does not 
alter PSI’s initial statement that PSI owes money to US Pipelining.”   (Id. (citing Martin 




PSI’s appellate briefing or the amended answers it submitted in connection with its Rule 
60(b) motion) did not explicitly reference any joint check agreement purportedly creating 
a direct obligation on the part of PSI to pay MTC for the supplies it had furnished to US 
Pipelining, setoffs, backcharges, or payment bonds.  However, it did juxtapose, on the 
one hand, “an outstanding balance owed the defendant a balance of $522,791.00” with, 
on the other hand, what PSI understandably characterizes as alleged setoffs, including 
$206,015.37 “at the request of US Pipelining to PSI to coordinate” as well as the 
$323,086.00 owed to MTC (which together exceed the outstanding balance).  (JA39.)  
Such ambiguous language obviously called for the sort of analysis or interpretation that a 
clerk or a prothonotary simply should not perform.  Accordingly, the entry of judgment in 
this matter could not be considered a purely ministerial act.    
 Prior to oral argument, we asked counsel “to please review and be prepared to 
discuss Lancaster County Bank v. Gross, 50 Pa. 224, 229 (Pa. 1865) (‘the court cannot go 
outside of the answers or receive extraneous proof to qualify or contradict’)” and to 
address “the applicability of this case to the instant matter.”  (Clerk’s Letter at 1.)  This 
1865 decision made clear that the answers themselves “form the exclusive foundation of 
the judgment.”  Id. at 229.  “In such a case, the court cannot go outside of the answers, or 
receive extraneous proof to qualify or contradict.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court upheld the refusal to enter judgment upon the answers, which (by 
incorporating the auditor’s report) “averred that the [legacy to the defendant] had been 
assigned to [another] before service of the attachment [and that this individual then 




According to the Lancaster County Bank court: 
 It will be observed then that the report does not furnish the assignments 
themselves, nor any facts bearing upon the circumstances of Jacob L Gross, 
the defendant, or upon the consideration of the assignments.  We have then 
simply the fact furnished by the answer that this legacy had been assigned 
by Gross, the defendant, before the service of the attachment.  This was 
sufficient for the court to refuse judgment, for it could not go outside of the 
answers to try the case.  That can be done only upon an issue wherein the 
facts would be submitted to the jury.  If the court should undertake to try 
the cause before itself, how is it possible its errors could be corrected?  The 
facts constituting fraud, want of consideration, or other matter alleged 
against the assignment, cannot appear in the record.  There is no bill of 
exceptions and no mode of bringing them here for review. 
 
Id. at 229-30.   
In Martin, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reviewed an answer filed by an 
attorney who claimed, inter alia, a setoff for counsel fees and costs incurred as counsel 
for the defendant in the defendant’s capacity as a guardian.  Martin, 15 Pa. Super. at 633-
34.  According to the Martin court, “[t]he answer of a garnishee is not to be construed 
with the same strictness as an affidavit of defense, but where such answer contains either 
a distinct admission of funds in possession, or of such facts as leave the possession of 
such funds a mere inference of law, the proper course is to enter judgment against the 
garnishee upon his answer.”  Id.  The state appellate court then applied the well-
established rule that “he who as an attorney at law has in any proceeding collected money 
for his client cannot set off against his client’s claim for that money a claim due him for 
services as counsel in any proceeding other than that out of which the money came, 
unless the client has expressly agreed that the fund shall be so appropriated.”  Id. at 634.  




individual compensation for services rendered to the client as a trustee absent the client’s 
express agreement.  Id. at 634-35.  In Martin, “[t]he answer of the garnishee does not 
allege that the defendant had agreed that his compensation for services as counsel in other 
proceedings, or those rendered to her in her distinctive character of guardian, should be 
retained out of the fund in his hands, and it, therefore, follows that he would not have 
been entitled to retain such compensation as against the demand of the defendant.”  Id. at 
635 (“He could not have set off these claims as against his client at the time the writ was 
served upon him, nor when he filed his answer, and what the client could demand the 
garnishee is certainly entitled to recover.”).  However, the answer also claimed credit for 
counsel fees and costs incurred “in the particular case in which [the attorney] received the 
money now in his hands.”  Id. at 634.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court deducted these 
amounts because “[i]t is clear that the garnishee had the right to retain out of the money 
in his hands compensation for the services rendered by him as counsel in the particular 
proceeding in which he received that fund, together with the amount of the costs by him 
in that proceeding expended.”  Id. (citing Balsbaugh v. Frazer, 19 Pa. 95 (1852)).   
Given this case law, judgment should not have been entered under Rule 3146.  We 
do not decide at this time whether the purported setoffs were legitimate or not.  See, e.g., 
Lancaster County Bank, 50 Pa. at 230 (“We correct this by entering the order that the 
court refuse judgment to the plaintiff upon the answers of the garnishees, discharge the 
rule to show cause, and give leave to the plaintiff to proceed and rule the garnishees to 
plead to issue and go to trial.  The case then can be heard on all its facts, whether of fraud 




a legacy or distributive share in mere expectancy will be supported in equity.”).  Instead, 
we simply determine that the language of PSI’s answer (i.e., “the exclusive foundation of 
the judgment,” id. at 229)—by ambiguously referencing both an outstanding balance and 
several apparent setoffs—did not rise to the level of either “a distinct admission of funds 
in possession, or of such facts as leave the possession of such funds a mere inference of 
law,” Martin, 15 Pa. Super. at 633-34.  See also, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Operating Eng’rs 
Local 66 Combined Funds, Inc. v. Huntar Dev. Corp., Misc. Action No. 04-399, 2007 
WL 1816278, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 2007) (stating that, although certainly “not a 
model of clarity,” general contractor’s answer still indicated “that this was not a clear 
case of admitted liability and a judgment by admission should not have been entered.”).    
 PSI argues that, “[e]ven if the September 19, 2019 Order were not subject to 
reversal, the district court erred by denying PSI’s Motion for Relief from Judgment 
Under Rule 60(b).”  (Appellant’s Brief at 51.)  Under Pennsylvania law, a garnishee may 
file a motion to strike or open the judgment with the trial court.  See, e.g., Ruehl, 474 
A.2d at 42 (“The unauthorized entry of a judgment by the prothonotary, however, renders 
a judgment void; and a judgment must be stricken if its defectiveness is apparent from the 
face of the record.” (citing Jones v. Seymour, 467 A.2d 878, 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983))).  
It appears undisputed that “[t]his [C]ourt has held that a party may obtain similar relief . . 
. through a Rule 60(b) Motion.’”  (Appellant’s Brief at 38 (citation omitted).)  Rejecting 
PSI’s argument that it entered judgment without complying with Pennsylvania’s 
garnishment requirements, the District Court concluded that, “[a]lthough PSI stated US 




its answer unequivocally admits PSI owes money to US Pipelining.”  Sanact, Inc. v. US 
Pipelining, LLC, MISCELLANEOUS ACTION No. 18-214, 2019 WL 7373743, at *5 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019) (observing that PSI’s additional statements did not raise any 
legal or factual issues that could be construed as effective denial of liability).  As we have 
explained, PSI’s answer on its face did not rise to the level of an unequivocal admission 
of liability.  Accordingly, the District Court erred by denying relief under Rule 60(b).   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s September 20, 2019 
order entering judgment in favor of Sanact and against PSI as well as its December 31, 
2019 order denying relief from this judgment under Rule 60(b).  We will remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
